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A basic principle codified in Rule 3.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is that a lawyer generally cannot be both an advocate and a wit-
ness in the same case.
rule 3.7 lawyer as Witness
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value
of legal services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client.
The rule applies to all lawyers in civil and criminal 
cases and is equally applicable to prosecutors and defense 
lawyers. Some courts, however, have expressed a special 
concern that a government lawyer comply with the rule 
because it “expresses an institutional concern, especially 
pronounced when the government is a litigant, that public 
confidence in our criminal justice system not be eroded 
by even the appearance of impropriety.” (United States 
v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).)
In the typical criminal case it is unthinkable that the
prosecuting attorney or the defense lawyer would seek 
to take the witness stand even if co-counsel were pres-
ent to conduct an examination. But both prosecutors 
and defense counsel must recognize that it is possible 
for a lawyer to violate the ethical rule without ever 
officially becoming a witness.
an illustrative Case
One case that illustrates how this can happen is United 
States v. Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 
2014). The defendant was charged with and convicted 
of importation of marijuana. The first paragraph of the 
court’s opinion summarizes the case in a very catchy 
way, which is not unusual in opinions by Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski:
It is said that every dog has its day. Unfortunately 
for Kevin Rangel-Guzman, the drug detection dog 
at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry was having a fine 
day on September 5, 2011, when Rangel-Guzman 
and a friend attempted to re-enter the United States. 
The dog alerted to their vehicle, and Customs and 
Border Protection officers conducted a search. Offi-
cers found 91.4 kilograms of marijuana, hidden in 
a compartment behind the backseat. Good dog!
(Id. at 1223)
On these facts it is easy to believe that the defense 
of Rangel-Guzman was a challenge. It turns out that 
both he and his friend gave statements to border agents 
after their arrest. At trial, Rangel-Guzman testified to a 
very different account from the one he provided to the 
agents. He claimed at trial that (1) his Aunt Martha and 
a cousin invited him a month before the arrest to a wed-
ding in Tecate, Mexico, so (2) he took a bus from Los 
Angeles to Tijuana and either a bus or taxi to Tecate and 
(3) returned to Los Angeles the same way; then (4) he
decided to go back to Mexico to “have a good time,” at
which point (5) Aunt Martha loaned him a car that (6)
he and his friend drove to his cousin’s house in Tecate
and (7) took a side trip by cab before (8) returning to
Tecate to pick up the car. In short, his defense was “I
didn’t know there was marijuana in the car.”
The Problem
Prior to trial, the assistant US attorney who prose-
cuted the case had a meeting attended by Homeland 
Security Agent Baxter, Rangel-Guzman, and Ran-
gel-Guzman’s attorney. When Rangel-Guzman’s trial 
testimony departed from what he had said in the meet-
ing, the prosecutor questioned him in a way that made 
clear that she believed he had made statements in the 
meeting inconsistent with his testimony. She interro-
gated him as follows:
You told us that you and your mother ran into 
Martha . . . You told us that four or five months 
before . . . That’s what you told us last week . . . 
Don’t you remember that I was shocked that you 
were saying it was four to five months before you 
got arrested?
(Id. at 1224.)
Although the prosecutor clearly was referring to her 
reaction to what Rangel-Guzman said during the pretrial 
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meeting, defense counsel failed to object. For the first 
time on appeal, appellate counsel argued that the prosecu-
tor improperly vouched and violated the advocate-witness 
rule. The absence of a timely trial objection left Rangel-
Guzman with the chance for only plain error review.
The court of appeals explained that it held govern-
ment lawyers to a high standard when it came to the 
advocate-witness rule:
We have previously found error where a prosecu-
tor’s actions might have “tak[en] advantage of 
the natural tendency of jury members to believe 
in the honesty of . . . government attorneys” even 
when those actions didn’t “fit neatly under either 
the advocate-witness rule or the vouching rule.” 
United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 922 (9th 
Cir. 1998).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
The court concluded that the prosecutor “became 
her own rebuttal witness” as it described her 
cross-examination:
The prosecutor made a number of statements 
that used variations on “but you told us” and 
“I asked you and you said,” as well as asser-
tions of fact about what had occurred during the 
meeting: “Well, we went over and over it, Mr. 
Rangel,” “[D]o you remember last week I specifi-
cally asked you multiple times who accompanied 
you to the Quinceanera?” And she left no doubt 
about her personal feelings during the meeting: 
“Don’t you remember that I was shocked that 
you were saying that it was four to five months 
before you got arrested [that you met Martha]?”
(Id.)
avoiding the Problem
The court explained how prosecutors can avoid the 
advocate-witness problem, and its advice is equally 
applicable to defense counsel:
When a prosecutor interviews a suspect prior to 
trial, the “correct procedure” is to do so “in the 
presence of a third person so that the third person 
can testify about the interview.” United States v. 
Watson, 87 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, 
Agent Baxter was present for the interview, so 
he could have taken the stand and testified that 
Rangel-Guzman had made the prior inconsistent 
statements. See United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 
455, 461 (9th Cir. 1972).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
Relying on the cases cited above, the court found 
that the prosecutor violated the advocate-witness rule:
Instead of calling Baxter, the prosecutor became 
her own rebuttal witness. By phrasing the ques-
tions as she did, she essentially testified that 
Rangel-Guzman had made those prior inconsistent 
statements. Doing so clearly took “advantage of 
the natural tendency of jury members to believe” 
in a prosecutor, Edwards, 154 F.3d at 922, and 
required the jury to “segregate the exhortations of 
the advocate from the testimonial accounts of the 
witness,” Prantil, 764 F.2d at 553. And, because 
the prosecutor wasn’t actually a witness, Rangel-
Guzman had no opportunity to cross-examine her 
about the accuracy or truthfulness of her account.
There can be no doubt that the AUSA was asking 
the jury to choose whether to believe her or the 
defendant. This was highly improper and unfair 
to the defendant.
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
The remedy and lessons learned
The government conceded that the prosecutor had 
violated the advocate-witness rule in her cross-exam-
ination, and the court commented favorably on the 
government’s response to the violation:
After oral argument before us, the United States 
Attorney “concede[d] that [the] cross-exami-
nation of defendant was error” and advised us 
that she “has instituted—in addition to exist-
ing training—a semi-monthly training update 
for the Criminal Division regarding pre-trial and 
trial phases . . . in which prosecutorial error may 
occur.” We commend the United States Attorney 
for the Southern District of California for her 
forthrightness and hope that her example will 
be followed by prosecutors across the circuit.
(Id.)
The court also chose to emphasize the importance 
of trial judges enforcing the advocate-witness rule:
We recognize the difficulty in identifying errors 
absent an objection. And we understand the dis-
trict court’s reluctance to intervene when the 
opposing party, perhaps strategically, declines to 
do so. But the prosecutor’s invocation of her own 
personal knowledge during cross-examination 
was unquestionably improper. Even absent objec-
tion, the court should have recognized this and put 
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a stop to it. See Henderson v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 1121, 1129–30, 185 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2013).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
In the end, the court found that the prosecutor’s 
erroneous questioning did not violate Rangel-Guz-
man’s substantial rights. The court concluded that 
there was no reason to believe that the jury would 
have believed his “convoluted tale” had there been 
no improper cross-examination. This, of course, is an 
application of the plain-error standard, which demands 
more of an appellant than can be delivered in most 
cases. The lesson for defense counsel is to make proper 
objections when there is a violation of the advocate-
witness rule. A proper objection might have ended the 
improper examination and, even if it did not, the stan-
dard on appeal would have been more favorable to the 
defendant/appellant.
So, there is something that all involved in criminal 
cases can learn from this case:
1. Prosecutors can violate the advocate-witness rule
without ever taking the witness stand.
2. Trial judges must be alert to protect against vio-
lations of the rule.
3. Defense counsel also must be alert to detect vio-
lations, must make timely and proper objections,
and must understand that they violate their duty
to clients when they fail to recognize that a cross-
examination has become a kind of rebuttal that
makes the prosecutor a witness. n
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